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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District 
Court: 
1. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating, Plaintiff/Appellee, represented by 
Steven Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Aspen Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendant/Appellant, 
represented by Joseph M. Chambers of HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS, Logan, 
Utah. Thomas D. Guy (940300014 CN - District Court), Diane Quinn (940000013 CV -
Circuit Court), and Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy (940000012 CV - Circuit Court) 
are the respective property owners and did not appear. The latter two Circuit Court cases 
were consolidated into the District Court proceeding at trial. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(3)0) and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3 and 4. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-3: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of costs, survey or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or by any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 
of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
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Utah Code Annotated §38-1-7: 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is 
situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or 
material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined 
in Section 38-11-102; or 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished 
the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and 
last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an 
acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of 
Documents. No acknowledgment or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 
29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the notice 
of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may 
be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorney's fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-55-604: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any action in any court of the 
state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which a license is required by this 
chapter without alleging and proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when the contract 
sued upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of action arose. 
Rule 59 U.R.C.P. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was presented from having a fair 
trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been 
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be provided by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it 
is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after 
the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a 
new trial is based upon affidavit they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 
days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written 
stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its 
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule61U.R.C.P. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF CASH 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from a judgment of the Third District 
Court, Summit County, which entered judgment ordering foreclosure of three (3) mechanics' 
liens filed by the Plaintiff after partially offsetting one of the lien claims by a partial amount 
Defendant Aspen sought as damages in its counterclaim. Said judgment also included a partial 
award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW: The 
Plaintiff Whipple Plumbing (hereinafter referred to as Whipple) filed three (3) separate lawsuits 
in Summit County to foreclose mechanics' liens on three (3) different parcels of property. The 
cases were later consolidated for purposes of trial. (Record 24) In a pretrial motion, the 
Defendants Thomas Guy, Aspen Construction and Diane Quinn (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as Aspen) asked the lower court to dismiss the HVAC (heating, venting and air conditioning) 
portion of Whipple's lien claim for one of the properties on the basis that Whipple lacked proper 
licensure and therefore under §58-55-604 U.C.A. lacked standing to maintain any action for 
compensation for such work. (Record 76-97)l Judge Brian ruled on the Motion at a hearing held 
May 8, 1995, granting Aspen's Motion to Dismiss, however, the court invoked equity and further 
ruled that to the extent Whipple had conferred a benefit upon the property Plaintiff should be 
awarded the value of said benefit. The court further ordered that by June 15, 1995, each of the 
parties were to hire their own independent heating contractor to examine the system to determine 
lFor some unknown reason, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of Lynn Padan 
in Support of Aspen's Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss are missing from the District Court files. These documents are included in 
Addendum 5 of Appellees Brief. 
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what, if any, deficiencies existed in the system and after offsetting the cost to correct any such 
deficiency or deficiencies Whipple was to be awarded the value of his work. (Record 113-116). 
Said Order was reduced to writing and entered on July 17, 1995. Whipple immediately hired a 
contractor who evaluated the system and who found, that but for some minor finish work which 
Whipple acknowledged needed to be completed and would have been completed had it not been 
dismissed from the job by Aspen, the system was compliant and satisfactory. Aspen never had 
anyone look at the system as ordered by the Court. 
On June 20, 1995, the trial court set the matter for trial for two (2) days in October, 1995, 
and established a Scheduling Order requiring, among other things, the parties disclose their 
witnesses including experts. However, Whipple's counsel was confused by the language of the 
Order in that Paragraph 6 of said Order provided that exhibit and witness lists were to be 
exchanged at the pre-trial while paragraph 11 provided that Plaintiff was to designate witnesses 
by August 1, 1995, and Defendant was to designate it's witnesses by August 15, 1998. (Record 
101, paragraph 11). Because of the language contained in Paragraph 6 Whipple's counsel 
overlooked Paragraph 11 as he entered the various scheduling dates in his calendar. On March 
30, 1995, Whipple provided in it's Answers to Aspen's First Set of Interrogatories, a list of all 
witnesses that it intended to call at the time of trial and summary of each such witnesses' 
testimony. 
On September 22, 1995, three days before the final Pre-trial Aspen filed it's Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to meet scheduling deadlines therein alleging Whipple failed to comply with 
the Scheduling Order or answer the discovery propounded by Aspen and in the Alternative a 
Motion in Limine. (Record 122-166) The trial court denied Aspen's Motion, ruling that Aspen 
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wasn't prejudiced since Aspen had a complete list of Whipple's witnesses and summary of their 
testimony since March of 1995. (Unrecorded pretrial conference of September 25, 1995; Motion 
renewed at trial for record. See transcript Vol. 1, pp. 15-21). 
The trial occurred over 4 V2 days-October 11-12, and November 28, 19 and 30, 1995, 
during which the court took evidence of the work which Whipple claimed to have provided to the 
three (3) separate properties. The Plaintiff sought recovery identifying eleven (11) separate 
claims.2 
Aspen presented evidence concerning its counterclaim wherein it sought damages for an 
alleged defective heating system at the 77 Thaynes Canyon property and disputed the value of 
some but not all the work Whipple Plumbing claimed to have performed. During the first 2 days 
of trial in October, the Plaintiffs witnesses primarily testified as to the work performed by 
Whipple Plumbing. The trial did not conclude as scheduled and it was continued until 
November 28, 1995. (Record 253) During this interim period of time, Mr. Kent Whipple 
obtained his HVAC contractor's license. Since Mr. Kent Whipple was designated as an expert 
witness by Whipple in its Answers to Interrogatories provided to Aspen in March of 1995 with a 
2Exhibit 12 included as Addendum 7. 
Reference Amount 
1. Sewer Laterals $10,200.00 
2. Thomas Guy Pool House $1,665.92 
3. Diane Quinn Sump Pump $1,100.00 
4. Municipal Water Line Re-location $6,660.80 
5. French Drains 77 Thaynes $3,162.05 
6. Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. $780.00 
7. Pool House Miscellaneous $65.00 
8. Diane Quinn Gas Line $631.00 
9. 77 Thaynes House Plumbing $13,358.00 
10. 77 Thaynes House Heating $12,265.00 
11.77 Thaynes House Gas Piping $ 1,015.00 
summary of his testimony which included Whipple's declaration to call Mr. Kent Whipple to 
testify concerning the heating system installed at the Thaynes Canyon property. (Answers to 
Interrogatories No. 7 and 8) (Record 214-218) the court allowed Mr. Kent Whipple to then testify 
i 
as concerning the heating system which he designed and installed at the 77 Thaynes Canyon 
I 
property and to rebut the testimony of Aspen's expert, Mr. Anthony Neeley 
During closing arguments on November 30, 1995, Aspen's counsel argued among other 
things, that there was no evidence admitted of any written "Notice of Lien Claim," and no 
evidence showing timely filing under §38-1-11, Utah Code Annotated. Whipple's counsel 
i 
argued that there was evidence that said liens had been filed and that since said liens were a 
public record Whipple's counsel asked the Court pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence to take judicial notice of the same. (Final Summation, Page 70). 
I 
On November 30, 1995, the court entered a Minute Entry (memorandum decision) which 
granted a judgment of approximately $3,900.003 in favor of Whipple. The Minute Entry 
indicated that each party was to bear their own attorney's fees. (Record 262-264) In the Minute 
Entry, the trial court requested Aspen's attorney to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment. No order of foreclosure was indicated. (Record 262-264) A complete 
copy of the trial's court's written decision - Minute Entry is included as Addendum 3 to 
Appellee's brief. 
Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary judgment in favor of Whipple along with proposed 
3
 The trial court appeared to have made a $7,000.00 error in Aspen's favor by omitting 
from the amount due and owing Whipple the invoice for sewer laterals in the amount of 
$7,000.00 + $3,200.00 = $10,200.00; the court had granted only the $3,200.00 portion of this 
part of the project. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Defendant Aspen did not prepare any specific 
Findings or Conclusions specifying foreclosure of the three (3) liens or any order of foreclosure. 
(Record 436-499) submitted December 15, 1995). 
Whipple's counsel objected to Aspen's proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment 
and prepared its separate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Foreclosure, 
(Record 277-284) and included therein the appropriate findings and order concerning the 
foreclosure of the three liens. Aspen objected to Whipple's proposed Findings and Conclusions 
claiming that the court had not by way of it's Minute Entry ordered foreclosure of the three liens. 
(Record 309-315); see also Transcript of February 15, 1996 hearing pp. 7-33. 
Whipple then timely filed its Motion to Reopen or in the Alternative to Supplement the 
Record to take additional evidence and prior to the court ruling upon said motion Whipple filed 
an amended Motion to Reopen (Record 334 and 362). The Defendant Aspen opposed both 
Motions. (Record 353 and 369). The court "in the interest of justice; granted Whipple's Motion 
and allowed the Plaintiff Whipple to reopen its case-in-chief for the purpose of supplementing 
the record with certified copies of the liens, testimony and evidence that copies of said liens had 
been mailed in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §38-1-7. (Reporter's 
Transcript of April 18, 1996. Hearing p.23; Record 1731). 
On September 19, 1996, the court held a further evidentiary hearing and took further 
evidence of the mechanic's liens and also took under advisement Whipple's request for 
reconsideration for an award of attorney's fees. Whipple Plumbing asserted that now having 
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the "prevailing party." (Record 411-419) The 
Defendant Aspen had requested a portion of its attorney fees be awarded since it prevailed 
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against Whipple on Whipple's mechanics' lien claim for the defective HVAC work. (Transcript 
p. 621-Record 1283) The trial court refused to award attorney's fees to Aspen and did award 
Whipple only $7,500.00 of its total fees incurred. (Minute Entry dated December 5, 1996, 
Record 420). 
Aspen asked the trial court for additional time to submit formal objections to Whipple's 
latest version of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared pursuant to the 
court's December 5, 1996, Minute Entry. On March 31, 1997, the trial court denied Aspen's 
Motion and at the same time signed Whipple's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment. These documents were filed with the Summit Court Clerk on April 7, 1997. 
(Record 500, 513) Aspen filed its Notice of Appeal with the Summit County District on April 29, 
1997. (Record 523). 
OVERVIEW OF FACTS 
Whipple Plumbing through its employee Bill Fenstermaker, Bidder/Manager, contracted 
with Aspen Construction to perform sewer line work, rough/finish plumbing, and HVAC work: 
sewer lateral contract 6-Exhibit #1 ^ $7,000.00 
rough plumbing contract-Exhibit #2 $ 13.000.00 
HVAC-Furnace Contract-Exhibit #19 $11,775.00 
Whipple Plumbing discovered Fenstermaker had embezzled/stolen from it and 
terminated and successfully prosecuted Fenstermaker. Whipple then contacted Aspen and 
primarily through Aspen's records and conversations with Fenstermaker had determined that 
Fenstermaker (both personally and on behalf of Whipple Plumbing) had been doing 
other work for Aspen. Whipple prepared invoices for all work that it believed had been 
9 
done for Aspen by Whipple's employees. These included: 
sewer laterals (curb to house)-Exhibit #2 $3,200.00 
(but see Exhibit #24 only $2,200.00) 
Tom Guy Pool house-Exhibit #3 $1,165.92 
Install trash compactor-Exhibit #4 $ 1,100.00 
Gas line-Jeremy Ranch-Exhibit #5 $631.00 
Municipal water line relocation-Exhibit #12 $6,660.80 
Job 4 (but see Exhibit #23 only $1,300.00) 
Backhoe usage-Exhibit #8 (at trial only claim $3,199.17 
for $780 pursued)(see Exhibit #12, Job 6) 
French drains-Exhibit #12, Job 5 $3,162.05 
Pool house misc.-Exhibit # 12, Job 7 $65.00 
Extras on HVAC contract bringing total to $12,265.00 
Extras on finish plumbing contract bringing total to- $13,358.00 
Aspen and Whipple Plumbing's relations deteriorated over the fact that Fenstermaker had 
admitted to Kent Whipple that he and Aspen had conspired to have Fenstermaker do work at a 
significantly lower rate and to pay Fenstermaker directly while on Whipple's time and using 
Whipple's employees. (Trial Transcript 197) 
The parties stipulated at trial that three (3) payments totaling $17,000.00 had been made 
by Aspen to Whipple Plumbing. Whipple sought recovery from Aspen for $33,968.27 plus costs 
and attorney fees. Below is a chart that summarizes the various jobs Whipple sought recovery 
for along with the amount ordered by the trial court: 
(Arranged by jobs references in Exhibit #12). 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Description 
Sewer Laterals 
T. Guy pool house 
E). Quinn sump pump 
Municipal water relocated 
French drains 
Backhoe 77 Thaynes 
Pool house misc. 
D. Quinn gas line 
77 Thaynes plumbing 
77 Thaynes heating 
77 Thaynes gas piping 
Subtotal 
Aspen offset for corrections 
to furnace Less payments 
TOTAL 
Lien 
Amount 
$10,200.00 
$1,665.92 
$1,100.00 
$6,660.80 
$3,162.05 
$780.00 
$65.00 
$631.00 
$13,358.00 
$12,265.00 
$1.015.00 
$50,903.27 
$-17.000.00 
$33,903.27 
Court Ordered 
Recovery 
$3,200.00 
$1,666.00 
$.00 
$.00 
$.00 
$100.00 
$.00 
$631.00 
$12,158.00 
$9,173.00 
$1.015.00 
$27,943.00 
$-17.000.00 
$3,943.00 
**Math error of $7,000.00 (see footnote 3 page 5) 
(Record 262-264) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Aspen Construction Company (hereinafter "Aspen") is a corporation involved in the 
i I 
general Contracting and building industry. Aspen holds a license as a general building contractor 
issued by the Utah Department of Business Regulations, Licensing and Contracting Division. 
(Transcript 45 l).j 
2. During the period of time this dispute arose, A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and 
Heating, inc., (hereinafter sometimes 4%Whipple Plumbing") was a corporation engaged in 
plumbing and heating system installations possessing a general plumbing subcontractor's license. 
Whipple Plumbing did not hold an HVAC subcontractor's license. A general plumbing 
subcontractor's license classification S210 (Record 64-70 <md 91) allows the subcontractor to 
install only boiler heating systems. An HVAC specialty license is required to install forced air 
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furnace systems and related sheet metal ducting. (Record 113, Order of Judge Brian which 
became the "law of the case."). 
3. Kent Whipple is the president of a corporation known as A.K.& R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. Whipple Plumbing is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Transcript 
20). 
4. Lynn Padan is the sole shareholder of Aspen Construction Company. Aspen is 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Transcript 451). 
5. In March of 1993 Mr. Fenstermaker was dispatched to meet with Mr. Kevin 
Monson, an employee of Aspen Construction whose responsibilities included the solicitation of 
bids from subcontractors and coordinating work with various specialty subcontractors, contacted 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating, Inc., via the yellow pages. (Transcript 485 and 
Appellant's Addendum 1) Initially, Aspen only needed a small plumbing job done on a residence 
of Mr. Thomas Guy in Park City, Summit County, Utah. Initially when Bill Fenstermaker 
arrived, he was in a Whipple truck wearing a Whipple uniform with simply an identification tag 
identifying his first name as Bill. Arrangements for the satisfactory performance of the Thomas 
Guy work were made, completed, and payment rendered accordingly. 
6. Bill Fenstermaker later inquired of Mr. Monson as to the type of subcontracting 
work which Aspen anticipated having in the near future and in particular, the scope and nature of 
future plumbing and heating jobs. (Transcript 496) Subsequently, Bill Fenstermaker, acting on 
behalf of Whipple and with actual authority of Whipple, engaged in preliminary negotiations 
with Monson. Kent Whipple, president of A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating, 
acknowledged during the trial that Bill Fenstermaker was a bidder-foreman-manager who had 
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broad authority to enter into contracts on behalf of Whipple to negotiate (even renegotiate) 
contracts and had authority to perform the contracts on behalf of Whipple. (Transcript 106-108) 
Fenstermaker was compensated on a base salary plus percentage of the work he obtained for 
Whipple. 
7. Bill Fenstermaker negotiated with Lynn Paden or Kevin Monson to do work directly 
for Aspen circumventing Whipple Plumbing and agreed to do various jobs for a lower than 
normal charge for which he would be paid directly. Fenstermaker did negotiate the following 
contracts: (Appellant's Addendum 1) 
(a) Contract installing two (2) sewer lateral from the street to the curb. (Exhibit 1-
contract price $7,000.00); 
(b) Plumbing contract rough and sub-rough and complete installation of fixtures but 
not including finish fixtures. (Exhibit 9-contract price $13,000.00); 
(c) Heating system contract (two furnaces) with regards to a forced air furnace system. 
This contract was later modified by the parties. (See Exhibit 19). 
8. Initially the parties contracted to install two (2) 80% efficient furnaces for the sum of 
$6,341.00. (Transcript 156) After Whipple Plumbing terminated Fenstermaker and before work 
was started on the HVAC system, Kent Whipple told Aspen that Whipple Plumbing could not 
perform the HVAC contract for that sum and after negotiations the parties agreed the contract to 
$11,775.00 for 90 percent efficient furnaces and eventually $12,790.00 inclusive of the gas line 
($11,775.00+ $1,015.00). (Exhibit 11) 
9. Kent Whipple testified that around late July, 1993, he discovered Bill Fenstermaker 
was embezzling and stealing funds, inventory, and/or materials from A.K. & R. Whipple 
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Plumbing and Heating. Bill Fenstermaker was later convicted of theft of property and at the time 
of trial was paroled to a halfway house in Salt Lake City. (Transcript 113). 
10. Sometime during the course of negotiations between the parties concerning the 
plumbing and HVAC furnace contracts, the parties became aware that there was a pressurized 
water line utilized by the Park City Golf Course which would need to be relocated to the lot line. 
Park City had agreed to pay for the relocation of the water line to a utility easement along the lot 
line. Bill Fenstermaker, bid this job for Whipple Plumbing and upon completion Aspen was 
invoiced by Whipple for $2,348.81. Kevin Monsen or Lynn Paden came to Fenstermaker and 
offered to pay him directly if he made the larger invoice "disappear." This invoice was never 
paid to Whipple nor did Fenstermaker receive any money for this job. (Trial Transcript 176-177) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Existing case law clearly supports Judge Brian's ruling wherein he allowed Whipple 
Plumbing to pursue compensation for the HVAC-furnace work, which it performed on the 
property owned by Aspen. Furthermore, Judge Noel's ruling on the amount of recovery was 
supported by the clear weight of evidence concerning the integrity of the system and the value 
conferred upon the property. 
Notwithstanding Aspen's argument to the contrary, the court had ample factual basis to 
grant Whipple an award for $3,200.00 for the sewer lateral. Furthermore, the court's award of 
$7,500.00 to Whipple for attorney's fees was appropriate based upon Whipple having prevailed 
on virtually all of the claims presented by him at the time of trial. 
While Aspen contends that it was error for the trial court to grant Whipple's motion to 
reopen on the grounds of "in the interest of justice," Whipple contends that the error was 
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harmless and that Aspen has failed to show substantial prejudice or that the outcome would have 
been different absent the error. Furthermore, the basis for Whipple's Motion to Reopen was 
based upon one of the grounds enumerated in Rule 59(a). 
The court's ruling in accepting evidence concerning and related to the filing of Whipple's 
mechanics liens at a subsequent hearing was appropriate and not violative of any rule of evidence 
of procedure. 
The trial court did not error in denying Aspen's Motion To Dismiss and Motion In 
Limine since Aspen had in his possession a list of all of Whipple's witnesses which it called at 
trial with the summary of their testimony and considering Aspen never attempted to depose or 
i 
seek further information from any of the witnesses from the time of disclosure in March of 195, 
up to the time of trial in October of 1995. Clearly, the court was correct in finding that Aspen 
suffered no prejudice from the failure to meet the scheduling deadline as it was argued. 
Furthermore, Kent Whipple's testimony concerning HVAC work was not objected to at trial by 
Aspen and in any event, Whipple was designated as an expert witness to testify concerning 
I 
HVAC work when it submitted its responses to Aspen's discovery in March, 1995. 
Aspen's argument that the court erred in refusing to allow their expert, Fred Nash to 
I 
testify fails to acknowledge or address the basis for the court's ruling which was that Mr. Nash's 
testimony exceeded the scope of proper rebuttal testimony and was an attempt by Aspen to illicit 
testimony from Mr. Nash concerning the HVAC system installed by Whipple taking into account 
that Mr. Nash had not been disclosed or designated as a witness prior to trial. 
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ARGUMENT I 
IT WAS WELL WITHIN JUDGE BRIAN'S DISCRETION 
TO PERMIT WHIPPLE RECOVERY FOR THE HEATING SYSTEM 
INSTALLED AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ALTHOUGH AT THE TIME 
OF INSTALLATION WHIPPLE DID NOT HAVE AN HVAC LICENSE 
At the time of trial Whipple had been a properly licensed contractor with a specialty 
classification of general plumbing contractor designated as S210 under the Utah Construction 
Trade and Licensing Rules (Record 64-70) for approximately 13 years. The S210 general 
plumbing contractors designation provides and permits one holding this classification to perform 
the following duties: 
"Fabrication and/or installation of material and fixtures to 
create and maintain sanitary conditions in buildings, by 
providing a permanent means for a supply of safe and pure 
water, a means for the timely and complete removal from 
the premises of all used or contaminated water, fluid and 
semi-fluid organic wastes and other impurities incidental to 
life and the occupation of such premises, and provision of a 
safe and adequate supply of gases for lighting, heating, and 
industrial purposes. Work permitted under this 
classification shall include the furnishing of materials, 
fixtures and labor to extend service from a building out to 
the main water, sewer or gas pipeline." (Emphasis added). 
In reliance upon the foregoing Whipple regularly engaged in the installation of forced air 
heating systems under the belief that his S210 license designation had permitted him to do so. 
Accordingly, Whipple bid on and proceeded with the installation of the forced air heating system 
at the 77 Thaynes Canyon Property. Whipple also maintained liability insurance which protected 
Whipple's customers against any errors and omissions which might occur as a result of its 
installation and with respect to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property Whipple was hired and 
supervised by Aspen the General Contractor (Record 64-70). At no time did Whipple ever 
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expressly or impliedly misrepresent his licensing status. 
I 
While Judge Brian granted Aspen's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds Whipple did not 
i l 
have an HVAC license, he did allow Whipple to recover under Common Law Principles of 
Equity which are articulated in Govert Copier Painting vs. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163 (Utah 
I 
App. (1990). In Govert our Supreme Court held that while the Plaintiff was not licensed he 
could recover upon proving that the purpose of the license statute was met to-wit: the protection 
of the public. The Court ruled as follows: 
"As long as the defendant is otherwise protected there is no 
need for insistence on the plaintiffs proper licensure. The 
Utah Supreme Court has allowed an unlicensed contractor 
to recover "from one who is otherwise protected from the 
harm the licensing requirements were designated to 
Prevent", such as where the contracting party is himself a 
licensed contractor, or where the work of the unlicensed 
contractor is supervised by a licensed contractor." 
Aspen was a licensed contractor and was further protected from errors which may have been 
occasioned by Whipple's improper work by liability insurance which Whipple maintained. 
The Court in Govert also stated that the court should consider the reason a contractor was 
unlicensed as an important factor in determining whether an exception should be made to strict 
compliance with the licensing statute. In this regard the Court held: 
"tn determining whether the purposes of the licensing 
statute were met, Utah's courts have also considered the 
reason a contractor was unlicensed an important factor. In 
Loader vs. Scott Constr. Co.. 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984), 
the court dealt with an unlicensed contractor who 
tfiistakenly believed he could perform work under his 
farmer partner's license. The Utah Supreme Court found 
that this was not a "willful disregard of the licensing 
statute." Id. At 1229-30. The court concluded that the good 
fciith of the contractor in believing he was operating under a 
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license was "one factor [to] consider in determining the 
[non-recovery] rule's application." Id. at 1230. 
In good faith Whipple had been actively engaged in the installation of forced air heating 
systems for more than sixteen years and notwithstanding Aspen's contention to the contrary there 
is no evidence in the record whatsoever that suggests Whipple's non-compliance with the 
licensing statute was anything but a good faith misunderstanding. (Trial Transcript 853) 
Aspen also relies upon the holding in American Rural Cellular, Inc. vs. Systems 
Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1995) to further assail Judge Brian's ruling. 
However the Court's holding in American Rural merely adopts the holding in Govert. The Court 
held as follows: 
"In Govert Copier Painting vs. Van Leeuwen, 801 
P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990), this court held that the Utah 
Legislature's adoption of a statutory bar to recovery "does 
not preclude the application of the previous common law 
exception to the general rule of non-recovery." Id. at 169. 
The common law exceptions to the general rule are 
all grounded in the notion that there is no need for rigid 
insistence on proper licensure when the public is otherwise 
protected from the harm that the licensing statute was 
designed to prevent, that is, inept and financially 
irresponsible builders. 
The court went on to discuss the same criteria as was discussed in Govert and in 
this regard stated the following: 
"A canvas of germane cases reveals that Utah courts have 
found several factors relevant to whether the purpose of the 
licensing statute has been met. First, the courts have 
emphasized that when the contracting party possesses 
knowledge and expertise in the field, it is not within the 
class of persons in need of the protection that the licensing 
statute was intended to provide. Thus, the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed an unlicensed contractor to recover when the 
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contracting party was itself a licensed contractor. Id.; 
Wilderness Bldg.Svs.. Inc. vs. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 
(Utah 1985); Lignell vs. Berg., 593 P.2d 800, 805 (Utah 
1979). 
Second, courts have considered whether the work of 
the unlicensed contractor was supervised by a licensed 
contractor. Id.; Kinkella vs. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983); Motivated Management Int'l vs. Finney, 604 
P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979); Fillmore Prods., Inc. vs. 
Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977). 
Third, courts have considered the reason the 
contractor was unlicensed. Some courts have declined to 
strictly apply the prohibition when a contractor who 
possessed the technical competence and financial 
qualifications for licensure merely allowed its license to 
lapse, Lignell, 593 P.2d at 805, or made a good faith 
mistake regarding its coverage under a partner's license, 
Loader vs. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229-30 
(Utah 1984). 
Finally the courts have considered whether the party 
seeking the protection of the Act relied on competence 
inferred from the unlicensed contractor having advertised 
itself as a general contractor, and whether the party was 
protected by a performance bond. Lignell, 593 P.2d at 805. 
In all cases, the burden of demonstrating that the purpose of 
the licensing statute was met lay with the unlicensed 
contractor. Govert Copier, 801 P.2d at 168. 
The holding in American Rural does not modify the holding of Govert therefore, as stated 
aforesaid if the court finds as it did that Whipple comes within the common law exceptions 
outlined in Govert and again reiterated in American Rural it was well within the trial court's 
discretion to allow Whipple recovery. 
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the testimony of Aspen's witness who identifies a 
lengthy list of problems with the heating system installed by Whipple, the court found only two 
problems with the system, to-wit: leakage and poor air flow to one room and no duct to a portion 
of the basement that contains the wet bar. (Record 262-264). A far cry from the eleven 
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complaints raised by Aspen's expert.4 
It is of further significance to note that from the time Whipple was removed from the job 
on August 1, 1993, until the final day of trial on November 29, 1995, 28 months had elapsed and 
in that time Aspen had not made any of the corrections to the heating system as recommended by 
its experts and had in fact listed the home for sale with the furnace in essentially the same 
condition it was when Whipple left the job in August of 1993. (Transcript 1042-1043) This 
alone should establish that Whipple's evidence and witnesses were more credible and that the 
court's ruling whereby Whipple was allowed a recovery was appropriate. 
Finally Aspen argues that Whipple should be denied recovery since he misrepresented his 
licensing status however, the record is devoid of any evidence of misrepresentation on Whipple's 
part. In fact there is nothing to suggest that Whipple's non-licensure was due to anything but a 
good faith misunderstanding on Whipple's part concerning his licensing status. And while 
Aspen attempts to suggest that Whipple came to this transaction with unclean hands it never 
during the course of the four and one-half day trial asked one question nor did it elicit one 
response that suggested Whipple had sought to mislead Aspen as to its licensing status. In fact 
Whipple's predicament as to its licensing status cannot be distinguished from the parties 
identified in the cases cited by Aspen since those parties were unlicensed and knew or should 
have known that they were unlicensed as well. 
4
 The court's conclusion more closely adopted the opinion of Whipple's expert, Jim 
Wright who only detected two problems, to-wit: insufficient heat to one room attributed merely 
to the fact that the wiring from the zone dampers had not been connected, a minor problem and 
that a cold air return should be moved closer to the furnace, the costs of which would 
approximate $400.00-$500.00 or less (Trial Transcript 717-728) 
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ARGUMENT II 
WHILE JUDGE NOEL MAY HAVE COMMITTED ERROR WHEN HE 
GRANTED WHIPPLE PLUMBING'S MOTION TO REOPEN ON GROUNDS 
NOT PROVIDED IN RULE 59 U.R.C.P. SAID ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and 
on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions and direct the entry of a new 
judgment." 
(4) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." 
Clearly the language of Rule 59(a) permits a movant to file a motion for a new trial and request 
the Court take additional evidence if in the Court's opinion, the movant comes within one of "the 
seven enumerated grounds set forth in Rule 59(a). 
As to the facts at hand Aspen prepared the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment as requested by the Court and omitted therefrom any mention of the foreclosure of the 
mechanics liens filed by Whipple. Whipple objected to said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment claiming that Aspen's proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law ana 
Judgment were not in conformity with the court's ruling since they made no reference to the 
foreclosure of the mechanic's liens. Whipple contemporaneous with filing its objection to 
Aspen's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment submitted its own 
i 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 500-512) In response Aspen objected to 
Whipple's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law claiming there was "Insufficient 
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evidence" for the Court to find that mechanics liens had been filed and that Whipple was entitled 
to foreclose the same as part of the judgment to be entered in this matter. (R. 309-315) 
Whipple then filed its Motion to Re-Open under Rule 59(a) and requested on the basis of 
insufficiency of evidence as already alleged by Aspen itself, that it be allowed to introduce 
further evidence concerning the filing of said liens and that the record be supplemented with such 
additional evidence. The Court granted Whipple's motion "in the interest of justice" and Aspen 
by way of this appeal claims the Court committed error by granting said motion since "in the 
interest of justice" is not one of the grounds enumerated in Rule 59(a). 
While Aspen's argument is technically correct it ignores the fact that there existed a 
justifiable basis under Rule 59(a) to grant the relief requested by Whipple, that being insufficient 
evidence which was raised not only by Whipple in its Motion to Reopen but by Aspen itself in its 
Objection to Whipple's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 309-315) 
Aspen claimed that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support an order by the Court 
allowing Whipple to foreclose its mechanics liens. Furthermore, Whipple alleged as the basis for 
its Motion to Reopen the claim of insufficient evidence. (R. 362-364) Accordingly, the basis 
for Whipple's motion was within the scope of Rule 59(a) and while the Court granted said 
motion on a ground other than one enumerated under Rule 59(a) such a ruling constituted 
harmless error. 
Rule 61 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"...No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is 
ground for...disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
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proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties." 
While admittedly the Judge may have committed error, Aspen must show that the error 
was substantial and prejudicial in that Aspen was deprived in some manner of a full and fair 
consideration of the disputed issues Onyeabor vs. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct.) and 
there existed a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different absent the error. 
See Batt vs. State, 503 P.2d 855 (1972). Aspen has presented no argument to show or suggest 
that the error committed was substantial or prejudicial or that the outcome would have been 
different absent the error therefore, the error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
THAT WHIPPLE PLUMBING HAS MET ITS BURDEN 
OF ESTABLISHING COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
MECHANICS' LIEN FORECLOSURE STATUTE 
Aspen incorrectly asserts that 'The evidence does not support the Trial Court's factual 
and legal conclusions that Whipple met its burden of establishing compliance with the 
mechanic's lien statute," While Aspen correctly indicates that the purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statute is to provide protection for those who enhance the value of property by supplying labor or 
materials, U.C.A. §38-1-8; Interiors Contracting, Inc. vs. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982) 
I 
Aspen's implications that such statutory liens are "unknown to common law" and therefore can 
have no common law basis is patently misleading. (See Argument HI, subsection C (below)). 
A. Contrary to Aspen's assertion, the record at p. 0536 through p. 0549 does establish 
Plaintiffs compliance with U.C.A. §38-1-7 in that the Court allowed supplementation of the trial 
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record at the hearing on Whipple's Motion to Reopen. The case was reopened in part to 
specifically address Aspen's complaint about the technical noncompliance with §38-1-7 despite 
oral testimony covering the filing and notice of the three mechanics' liens. Each element of the 
notice and filing statute was specifically addressed, and oral and documentary evidence was 
received, allowed and accepted by the Trial Court. 
Aspen's counsel's self-proclaimed 'technocratic practice of law' (Record, p. 568) has not 
resulted in a 'marshaling of all of the evidence supporting the findings" and does nothing to 
demonstrate that "the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence.'" Mountain States Broadcasting vs. Neale, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 
1989). Indeed, Aspen has failed completely to acknowledge (or marshal) the contents of the 
fourteen pages of the Record (pp. 0536-0549) where the issue was addressed and resolved. The 
evidence now in the record clearly shows that the statutory filing and notice requirements were 
actually and properly complied with. 
B. Aspen cannot contend that there is no evidentiary basis to support Judge Noel's 
findings (Record pp. 0506-0507, Paragraph 17) that the parties had entered into an "oral 
agreement" for the installation of sewer and water laterals from the curb to the Thaynes Canyon 
house and that "the reasonable value of for said work is $3,200.00 for which Whipple has not 
been paid." The record contains more than 50 pages of testimony on the issue from seven 
different witnesses and at least six exhibits: Kenneth Whipple (Record pp. 0687-0700, 0780-
0784, 0787, 1294-1296, 1572); Bill Fenstermaker (Record pp. 0829-0833, 1080-1084); Janele 
Whipple (Record 0943-0949); James Mathews (Record pp. 1093-1095); Lynn Paden (Record pp. 
1116-1118, 1304-1307, 1340-1349); Kevin Monson (Record 1157-1161, 1207-1208, 1218-1219, 
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1229-1230); Troy Neerings (Record pp. 1409-1412); and Plaintiffs exhibits 1, 2, 19, 12, 17, 32 
and Defendants' exhibit 36. 
On the basis of the foregoing, Aspen has failed to demonstrate that "the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.' Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. vs. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989), (quoting Bartell 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). Specifically lacking in Aspen's reasoning is its insistence that 
recovery based on contract must somehow comport with reasonable values, customary charges, 
or industry standards. The Court heard evidence regarding the value of the contested lateral work 
simply to determine whether this work was implicitly included in one or the other or two 
uncontested contracts between the parties. Finding that it was not and was an independent 
agreement, judgment was rendered based on the terms of the agreement supplied by Whipple. 
Having failed to submit any contradictory evidence as to those terms, Aspen cannot now claim 
that the trial judge erred in failing to use "customary charges" as a straw-man advocate on the 
Aspen's behalf. 
C. The Trial Court did not err in granting Whipple a statutory mechanics' lien on the 
basis of its equitable recovery for the HVAC work performed. The statute does not exclude 
those entitled to equitable relief from those entitled to acquire relief by virtue of a mechanics' 
I 
lien. To-wit: 
38-1-3 THOSE ENTITLED TO LIEN-WHAT MAY BE ATTACHED. 
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or renting any 
materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, 
or improvement of any building or structure or 
improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
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architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of costs, survey or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of 
the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or by any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise 
except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner may 
have in the property." Utah Code Annotated §38-1-3 
(1953). 
Aspen's contention that Whipple is precluded from receiving and foreclosing its 
mechanics liens because they are derived as an equitable remedy is clearly in contradiction with 
the plain language of the statute. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS THAT WHIPPLE PLUMBING WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD ASPEN 
ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN IT PREVAILED AGAINST WHIPPLE ON THE HVAC 
PORTION OF WHIPPLE'S LIEN CLAIM 
In it's argument Aspen asserts that the evidence does not support the Trial Court's factual 
and legal conclusions that Whipple was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and that the Trial 
Court erred in refusing to award Aspen its attorney fees because it prevailed against Whipple on 
the HVAC portion of Whipple's lien claim. 
Aspen's argument ignores that Whipple was compelled by Aspen to engage in litigation 
and to incur the costs associated thereto in order to achieve judicially granted liens in the 
amounts and on the properties identified in Judge Noel's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law, Civil No. 94-03-00014. Two of these liens, Civil No. 94-12CV and Civil No. 94-13CV, 
were and remain uncontested. "Sec. 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended provides: 
'In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
I 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which will be taxed as costs in the 
action'." Palombi vs. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah 1969). For succeeding on the 
enforcement of the two liens cited above, Plaintiff is clearly entitled to receive its fees and costs. 
With regard to the third lien, Civil No. 94-14CV, the total amount of the lien awarded to 
Plaintiff represents the aggregate of the contractual value of the plumbing, gas line, and sewer 
lateral work on the Thaynes Canyon property, and the equitable value of the heating system 
installed and the use of a particular piece of Plaintiff s construction equipment at the same 
location. The award of Plaintiff s fees and costs associated with successfully prosecuting the 
contractual portions of this lien are proper under the same authority cited above, Utah Code 
Annotated §38-1-18, in reference Civil No. 94-12CV and Civil No. 94-13CV. 
The award of Whipple's costs and fees for successful prosecution of the equitable portion 
of the lien on the 77 Thaynes Canyon property is also proper. In Stewart vs. Utah Public Service 
Confn, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) the court held: 
"[I]n the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, 
a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable 
attorney's fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest 
of justice and equity. In Hall vs. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 
S.Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973), the United States 
Supreme Court stated: "Indeed, the power to award such 
fees 'is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do 
equity in a particular situation,' Sprague vs. Ticonic 
National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166, 59 S.Ct. 777 [780], 83 
L.Ed. 1184 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to 
exercise this inherent equitable power whenever 'overriding 
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considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.'" 
Judge Noel clearly indicates on pp. 6-7, 11 of his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law that the awards for the benefits imparted on Defendants by Plaintiffs work on the heating 
system and the use of its equipment were founded in furthering the interest of justice and equity. 
(Record 500-512). 
A. The record clearly indicates that Plaintiff recovered on three causes of action for 
Defendants' breach of contracts. Plaintiff recovered on two causes of action in equity for 
Defendants' unjust enrichment. However, Plaintiff must concede that the record does not 
sufficiently apportion the single attorney's fee award among Plaintiffs various contractual and 
equitable recoveries for the Appellate Court to determine whether the fee award was reasonable 
under the facts of the case. Given the great weight of the authority calling for such an 
apportionment5 and an explicit statement of the record supporting the award6, this issue, is 
appropriate for remand to the Trial Court for further explanation of how the fee award was 
derived. 
B. The Trial Court did not err in failing to award Defendant's attorney's fee because the 
record clearly indicates that Defendant did not successfully defend against the HVAC lien. 
5See Cottonwood Mall Co. vs. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-270 (Utah 1992); LMV Leasing. 
Inc. vs. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 198 (Utah App. 1991); Graco Fishing vs. Ironwood Exploration, 
766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988); Cabrera vs. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985); 
Travner vs. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
6See Selvage vs. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 1996); Equitable 
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. vs. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993); Baldwin vs. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1188 (Utah 1993); Rappleve vs. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993); Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. vs. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989); Dixie State Bank vs. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Leger Construction, Inc. vs. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976). 
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(Judge Noel's 11/30/95 Minute Entry, page 2 (Record 497-499); Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 4, paragraph 8 (Record 500-512)). While early in the proceedings thert 
was a change in theory on which Plaintiffs recovery for the HVAC work was granted, the facts 
demonstrate that Defendants' only incurred costs and fees merely to avoid payment of a 
legitimate and substantiated debt; i.e., in an attempt to get something for nothing from Plaintiff. 
No further evidence is required to demonstrate that this foiled attempt does not make Defendants 
the 'prevailing' party with regard to the HVAC lien. "Typically, determining the 'prevailing 
party' for the purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues Defendant for 
money damages; if Plaintiff is awarded a judgment, Plaintiff has prevailed, and if Defendant 
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, Defendant has prevailed. However, this 
simple analysis cannot be employed here because both Plaintiff and Defendant obtained some 
monetary relief against the other. Mountain States Broadcasting vs. Neale, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah 
App. 1989); (for discussion of'prevailing party' see also Brown vs. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 
(Utah App. 1992); Travner vs. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, both 
parties did receive some monetary relief against the other; however, there is clearly only one 
prevailing party-the Plaintiff. A close examination of the record indicates that the off-set on the 
HVAC work granted Defendants was meant to accurately account for the value of the work 
performed. Plaintiffs monetary judgment and lien, on the other hand, are evidence of its legal 
right to compel Defendants to pay for the value of the benefits received. It is the vindication of 
this legal right that makes the Plaintiff the 'prevailing party' on the HVAC issue; and that entitles 
i i 
Plaintiff rather than Defendants to recover costs and fees. The Trial Court recognized this fact 
and so ruled. 
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ARGUMENT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT MADE THE FOLLOWING RULES: 
A. DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION IN LIMINE 
B. ALLOWED KENT WHIPPLE TO TESTIFY AS AN HVAC EXPERT 
C. REFUSED TO ALLOW REBUTTAL TESTIMONY FROM ASPEN'S 
EXPERT WITNESS 
The Trial Court did not err when it failed to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
their alternative Motion in Limine. Defendants rely heavily on cases that reinforce the 
proposition that parties who engage in dilatory or malicious pre-trial antics will not be allowed to 
profit by them and will be sanctioned; even up to and including having their cause of action 
dismissed. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 43). However, the Judge Noel correctly noted, without 
citing the authority which he was relying on, that: "[The Supreme Court has] told us that there 
have been some cases that are also filed where violations of discovery orders cannot serve as a 
basis for dismissing an action because the other party hasn't shown prejudice necessarily." 
(Record pp. 0677-0678). 
In this case neither party specifically complied with the precise terms of the Scheduling 
Order, i.e., the final disclosure of trial witnesses prior to the August 1, 1995, and August 15, 
1995, deadlines. Nevertheless prior to this deadline, Defendants did have in their possession not 
only the names of those who testified at trial but also a summary of the testimony of each 
witness, which had been disclosed through the course of interrogatories in March. The only 
witness not disclosed in the interrogatories was a construction inspector ordered by the court to 
be retained after the March disclosures. Disclosure of this witness was made to Defendants June 
15, 1995; six weeks prior to Plaintiffs deadline. Despite voicing his displeasure with counsel for 
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both parties at their failure to comply with the scheduling order, Judge Noel denied all pretrial 
motions finding; "that there ha[d]n't been shown sufficient prejudice because the information 
with regard to witnesses was supplied as to those who would testify at trial..." (Record p. 0679). 
The Trial Court did not err in allowing Kenneth Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert 
witness because he did not testify as an HVAC expert witness. On the insistence of Aspen's 
counsel "he was listed as an expert witness as a journeyman plumber." He went on to say; "And 
I think the record needs to reflect that and I'll sit down and be quiet." Which he did. Not once 
during the remainder of Whipple's ensuing 50 pages of testimony did defense counsel object that 
Whipple was testifying outside his expertise as an HVAC expert rather than as an expert 
journeyman plumber. (Record pp. 1513-1563) Defendants have waived such objections and have 
failed to preserve the issue for appeal. It should be noted that during the course of the trial, 
Whipple did receive his HVAC expert certification and contractors license from the State of 
Utah. 
Despite repeated sanctions, and Herculean efforts to explain, by the Court, defense 
counsel still has not grasped the concept of 'rebuttal testimony.' (Record pp. 1641-1651). Fred 
I 
Nash was excluded from testifying in Defendants' case-in-chief as an HVAC expert because he 
was not on the witness list and was not disclosed until the day of the trial. (Record 1110-1111). 
As a rebuttal witness, he was constrained strictly to respond to the testimony presented at trial 
and was not allowed to interject conclusions based on his own investigations of the subject 
property. Rebuttal is not a method for shoehorning in testimony that has otherwise been 
excluded. Judge Noel did not err in failing to prevent Defendants from abusing the evidentiary 
rules regarding the scope of rebuttal testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aspen has attempted by this appeal to assail the basis for the trial court's decision on a 
number of theories however, the foregoing has clearly shown that Aspen has failed to establish 
that the court's rulings on the evidence, law or procedure was flawed or sufficiently flawed to 
overturn or modify the trial court's findings or rulings. Therefore, Whipple respectively requests 
that Aspen's appeal be denied. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of September, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ 
STEVEN B. WALL / 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
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